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Abstract. Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance as it helps
to protect users’ privacy by ensuring that their identity remains unknown.
Anonymity protocols generally su
 er from denial of service (DoS) attack, as re-
peated message retransmission a
 ords more opportunities for attackers toanalyse
tra
Æc and lower the protocols’ privacy. In this paper, we analyse how users can
minimise their anonymity loss under DoS attacks by choosing to remove or keep
‘failed’ nodes from router lists. We also investigate the strategy e
 ectiveness in
those cases where users cannot decide whether the ‘failed’ node are the targets of
DoS attacks.
1 Introduction
Protecting online privacy is an essential part of today’s society and its importance is in-
creasingly recognised as crucial in many ﬁelds of computer-aided human activity, such
as eVoting, eAuctions, bill payments, online betting and electronic communication.
One of the most common mechanisms for privacy is anonymity, which generally refers
to the condition of being unidentiﬁable within a given set of subjects, known as the
anonymity set.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to enforce privacy through the use of
anonymity networks (e.g. [5,15,19,11,18]). Yet, the open nature of such networks and
the unaccountability which results from the very idea of anonymity, make the existing
systems prone to various attacks (e.g. [14,16,17,9]). The evaluation of such attacks
on anonymity systems has largely focused exclusively on security – that is, how likely
anonymityis to be compromised– with all otherpossiblemetrics consideredtangential.
Recent work, however, has started to address parameters such as performance and re-
liability [8,13,20], which are factors are self-evident importance: an unreliable system,
or anyway a scarcely unusable system, will cause users to take their communications
to other channels,possibly non-anonymous,and defeatthe system’s purpose altogether.
An adversary may selectively a
 ect the reliability of the system in those states which
are hardest to compromise,in their attempt to make the system prefer less secure states.
Faced with poor reliability, many users (and a lot of software too) will naturally at-
tempt to repeat communication(resend messages), o
 ering more opportunitiesfor traf-
ﬁc analysis and attacks. Consequently, a considerable amount of research has recently
been focussing on DoS attacks to anonymity networks [27,2,3,21].
In a DoS attack, the attacker is able to deanonymise users by a
 ecting system relia-
bility. More speciﬁcally, the attacker will choose users who are hardest to compromise,
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Fig.1. Partial anonymity networks
and will attempt to make them appear as ‘failed’ to other users. That is, the attacker
will actively make the targeted nodes very busy, so as to make them become unre-
sponsive to their peers who seek cooperation to forward messages according to the se-
lected anonymityprotocol.E
 ectively,the target nodes remain cut o
  very soon indeed
(cf. e.g. [24]). Throughoutthe paper, we refer to such slow
 unresponsive
 compromised
nodes simply as failed (or apparently failed) nodes. While nodes under attack become
unresponsive, malicious users on the network make sure to keep relative idle, thereby
inducinghonestusers(andsoftwarealike)to attemptto communicate(viz.,reroutetheir
communicationpath) throughthem. In this way, malicious users obtaina doubleadvan-
tage: they decrease the ratio of cooperating users in the system, and make themselves
lookasverye
Æcientcommunicationpeers,to be preferredoverthe others.Considerfor
instance the partial anonymity networksof Figure 1. In (a) user A sends a message to C
via B. Assume now that B is targeted by a DoS attacker, then B appears failed to A. So
A has to rebuild a path for forwarding messages to C. User A now sends the message
to C via D in Figure 1(b). Therefore, if D is a malicious user, then the probability of
identifying A increases because of D’s own guess or both B and D’s collaboration or
other eavesdroppers.
Papers[2,3,21]showedthattheDoSattacksinanonymoussystemsreduceanonymity
considerably, so that in recent years, a considerable amount of research has been fo-
cusing on reﬁning such systems. In particular, trust-and-reputation-based metrics have
become quite popular in this domain [1,6,7,10,25,26]. Yet, introducing trust into the
picture opens the ﬂank to new security attacks, exploiting trust mechanisms explicitly,
as provedin [24]. In such work, the authors evaluated the anonymityloss in trust-based
C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol when DoS attacks take place. At the moment, there are no perfect
solutions to address the DoS attacks. So, it becomes of great practical relevance to
study what a user can do to minimise her anonymity loss when exposed to such attack
scenarios.
In this paper,we investigatethetwo strategiesa user can adoptwhenconfrontedwith
a failed node, viz., whether to remove or keep the ‘failed’ node from their router list,
and try to determine which one is the best approach under di
 erent scenarios.
The C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol allows Internet users to perform anonymous web transactions
bysendingtheirmessagesthrougha randomchainofusersparticipatingin theprotocol.
Each user in the ‘crowd’ must establish a path between her and a set of servers by
selecting randomly some users to act as routers (or forwarders). Such routing paths
are formed so as to guarantee that users do not know whether their predecessors are416 M. Yang and V. Sassone
message originators or just forwarders. Each user only has access to messages routed
through her. It is well known that C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ cannot ensure strong anonymity in presence
ofcorruptparticipants[23,4],yetwhenthe numberofcorruptusersissu
Æcientlysmall,
it provides a weaker notion of anonymity known as probable innocence: informally, a
sender is probably innocent if to an attacker she is no more likely to be the message
originator than not to be.
In this paper we use the metric of probable innocence to measure anonymity loss. In
otherwords,weconsiderDoSattacksaswellastheclassical insiderattacktoanonymity
networks, which is when the malicious users in the systems collaborate to report (to
someunspeciﬁedauthority)the mostlikelyinitiatorofeachmessagetheyintercept.The
list of participants (or users, or members) in C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is kept by a server called blender,
which provides it to all registered users. When new node starts running the system to
join the crowd,andis willing to act as a message-forwarder,the blenderadds it to its list
of routers. Each user maintains their own local list of routers, which is updated when
the user receives notices of new or deleted members from the blender. Yet, the user can
also drop routers from her list by her own decision, if she detects failed nodes.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows: we recall the fundamen-
tal ideas behind the C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol and its properties, including the most popular
anonymity metrics, in
￿2b e l o w .T h e ni n
￿3 we present our ﬁrst contribution: a model
of the interactions between users and DoS attackers and, by using the game theoretic
notion of Nash Equilibrium, an analysis of the strategies chosen by the users. Then,
￿4
repeats the analysis for a reﬁned model in which we take into account the users’ uncer-
tainty about the nature the ‘failed’ node, viz., whether it is malicious or a honest user
under a DoS attack. In such analysis, we introduce and discuss a key parameter, the
probability that the ‘failed’ node is malicious, and presents some preliminary results of
its analysis.
2 Related Work
Using conditionalprobabilitiesto measure anonymitylevel was proposedby Reiter and
Rubin [23]. They proposed a hierarchy of anonymity notions in the context of C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
These rangefrom‘absoluteprivacy,’where the attackercannotperceivethe presenceof
an actual communication,to ‘provably exposed,’ where the attacker can prove a sender-
and-receiver relationship. The most important level is ‘probable innocence’w h i c hw a s
originallydeﬁnedas“A senderis probablyinnocentif, fromtheattacker’spointofview,
she appears no more likely to be the originator than to not be the originator.”
Let n be the number of users participating in the protocol and let c and n
￿ c be the
number of the corrupt and honest members, respectively. Since anonymity makes only
sense for honest users, we deﬁne the set of anonymousevents as
￿
 
￿a1
￿a2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿an
￿c
￿,
where ai indicates that user i is the initiator of the message.
As it is usually the case in the analysis of C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, we assume that attackers will
always deliver a request to forward immediately to the end server, since forwarding it
any further cannot help them learn anything more about the identity of the originator.
Thus in any given path, there is at most one detected user: the ﬁrst honest member toMinimising Anonymity Loss in Anonymity Networks under DoS Attacks 417
forward the message to a corrupt member. Therefore we deﬁne the set of observable
events as
￿
 
￿o1
￿o2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿on
￿c
￿,w h e r eoj indicates that user j forwarded a message to
a corrupted user. In this case, we also say that user j is detected by the attacker. The
corresponding notion of probable innocence is formalised by Reiter and Rubin [23]
via the conditional probability that user i is detected given that she is the initiator, in
symbols P(oi
￿ai). Probable innocence holds if
￿i
￿ P(oi
￿ai)
￿
1
2
(1)
In [23] it is also proved that the following holds in C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿:
P(oj
￿ai)
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
n
￿ c
￿ 1
n
pf i
  j
1
n
pf i
￿ j
(2)
Therefore, probable innocence (1) holds if and only if
n
￿
pf
pf
￿ 1
￿2
￿
c
  1
￿
and pf
￿
1
2
￿
The formulae above show that the number n of participating users inﬂuences substan-
tially the anonymity level that the system can provide to its users. If honest users are
lost to the network, either because compromised or voluntarily withdrawn or removed
from a router list following a DoS attack, then the remaining honest users will indire-
clty su
 er a loss of anonymity.This happensof course as a side-e
 ect of being part of a
network which can only provide a lower anonymity guarantee, due to a less favourable
ratio of honest and malicious users.
Numerous denial of service (DoS) attacks have been reported in the literature. In
particular, the ‘packet spinning’ attack of [21] tries to lure users into selecting mali-
cious relaysby targetinghonest users by DoS attacks. The attacker creates long circular
paths involving honest users and sends large amount of data through the paths, forcing
the users to employ all their bandwidth and then timing out. These attacks motivate the
demandfor mechanismsto enhancethe reliability of anonymitynetworks.In particular,
paper [3] investigates the e
 ects of DoS attacks on some anonymity systems, such as
Tor, Hydra-Onion, Cashmere, and Salsa, and shows greater opportunities to compro-
mise anonymity under DoS attack, and the systems cannot tolerate a majority of nodes
being malicious.
To addresstheDoSattack,severalmechanismswereproposedto enhanceanonymity
against DoS attacks. Trust-and-reputation-based metrics are quite popular in this do-
main [1,6,7,10,25,26]. Enhancing the reliability by trust and reputation, not only does
improve the system’s usability, but may also increase its anonymity guarantee. Indeed,
a trust-based selection of relays improves both the reliability and the anonymity of the
network, by delivering messages through ‘trusted’ routers. Moreover, the more reliable
the system, the more it may attract users and hence improve the anonymity guarantee
by growing the anonymity set. Introducing trust in anonymity networks does however
open the ﬂank to novel security attacks, as proved in [24].418 M. Yang and V. Sassone
Importantly, a users’ own response to a DoS attack may e
 ectively decrease their
anonymity loss. In particular, in the design of C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, users can choose removing or
keeping routers if they detect those routers (or nodes) failed, and each response will
lead to di
 erentanonymitypayo
 s. In this paper, we investigatethis and ﬁnd out which
response yields the best strategy for users under di
 erent scenarios.
3 Minimizing Users’ Anonymity Loss
3.1 Preliminaries and Notations
As discussed in the previous section, the C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol and the related metrics to
measure its anonymity have been enhanced against DoS attacks. Among these, the no-
tion of trust has been considered. However, introducing trust in anonymity networks
paves the way novel attack opportunities. In this section, we focus on how to mini-
mize the anonymity loss without introducing new mechanisms. We ﬁrst describe our
approach based on game theory, then model users and DoS attackers as players in our
game, and devise formulae for these players’ payo
 s. Finally, we investigate the strat-
egy users should choose and its e
 ect compared with other response actions under DoS
attack.
We adopt two working assumptions: users want to forward messages to others, and
they value their anonymity. Thus in our analysis of the paper, we take anonymity as
part of evaluation of users’ payo
 s. The anonymity systems generally consist of two
groups of components under the DoS attacks: users compete against DoS attackers for
good anonymity services (e.g., good privacy level guaranteed by the systems) and, at
the same time, the DoS attackers try their best to de-anonymize the systems. Here,
users’ strategic objective, their ‘utility’, is to minimize their anonymity loss, while the
attackers endeavour to gain maximum beneﬁts from the attacks.
As discussed in
￿2, the DoS attack is deployed to make the target (honest) user, say
k unavailable or unresponsive. This causes the message forwarder, say i, to reroute her
(anonymity) path to her messages’ destinations, say D, and thus su
 er anonymity loss
implied by the rerouting activity and, at the same time, run an increased risk to pick the
malicious users on her new paths which illustrated in Figure 2.
As such, the interaction between user i and the attackers A in the anonymity sys-
tems is best modeled as a non-cooperative game among the rational and strategic play-
ers. Players are rational because they wish to maximize their own gain, and they are
Fig.2. The attacker targets node k making it unavailable to user i.U s e ri chooses her
strategy –whether removing k from her router list– by predicting the attacker’s strategy.Minimising Anonymity Loss in Anonymity Networks under DoS Attacks 419
strategic because they can choose their actions (e.g., remove failed node from router
list) that inﬂuence both their payo
 s. Another force tending to a
 ect users’ anonymity
payo
 s is the so-called ‘churn problem’ [22], which is caused by frequent ‘arrivals’
and ‘departures’ of users. In order to coordinate such membership events, the standard
implementation of Crowds makes use of a dedicated process, the so-called ‘blender.’
Among its functions, the blender provides updates to the users’ lists of crowd members
at regular intervals, In this paper we use T to to represent such interval, and model a
user’s behaviour during the time interval between two list updating events.
With respect to the target node k, the attackers have the following two strategies:
– Strategy S
￿
1: keep targeting k;
– Strategy S
￿
2: target a user other than k,s a yk
￿.
The user i also has two strategies:
– Strategy S 1: remove k from router list;
– Strategy S 2: keep k on the router list.
With these strategies above, the payo
 s of these two players are expressed in the form
of 2
￿ 2 matrices, Ui( )a n dUA( ), which denote user i’s and the attackers’ payo
 ,
respectively. A game is called a zero-sum game, if the sum of the utilities is constant
in every outcome, so that whatever is gained by one player must be lost by the other
players, that is, in our case, if the sum of Ui( )a n dUA( ) is constant, then our game is
a zero-sum game.
Interesting economic behaviour occurs when the utility of a player depends not only
on her own strategy, but on the other’s strategy as well. The most popular way of char-
acterising this dynamics is in terms of Nash equilibrium. Since a player’s utility de-
pends on her strategy, she might unilaterally switch her strategy to improve her utility.
This switch in strategy will a
 ect the other player, so that she might decide to switch
her strategy as well. One game reaches a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve
her utility by unilaterally switching strategy. In Section 3.2, we will model the sce-
nario illustrated in Figure 2 and study the equilibrium of our game. We present here
for the reader’s convenience a table summarizing those variables that will appear in the
modeling.
3.2 Users’ Protection Model
We ﬁrst discuss the notations which are used in the evaluation of i’s utility function:
– Ui(t): it reﬂects i’s anonymity level guaranteed by the system. At time t
￿ T,u s e r
i su
 ers the DoS attack and then she chooses her strategy, thus her payo
  at time
t
 1
￿ T is deﬁned as Ui(t
 1). For time t, the payo
  Ui(t) can be evaluated by the
anonymity measure metrics as
Ui(t)
  1
￿ P(oj
￿ai)t
where P(oj
￿ai)t represents the anonymity level measuring of user i at time t. Thus,
the value of Ui(t) is not greater than one. The smaller the value of P(oj
￿ai)t,t h e
higher anonymity level of user i guaranteed, that is, the greater i’s payo
  Ui(t);420 M. Yang and V. Sassone
– Li:w h e nu s e ri mistakenly removes an normal honest user from her router list, she
will su
 er some anonymity loss which is measured by Li. The loss here can be
evaluated by the probableinnocence anonymitymetrics, which we described in
￿2.
In particular, in systems like C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol, the loss will be
￿
1
￿
￿
1
￿
n
￿ c
￿ 1
n
pf
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
1
￿
n
￿ 1
￿ c
￿ 1
n
￿ 1
pf
￿
￿
 
n
￿ c
￿ 1
n
pf
￿
n
￿ 1
￿ c
￿ 1
n
￿ 1
pf
 
c
  1
n(n
￿ 1)
pf
￿
– Lik: if the attacker successfully perpetrates a DoS attack by targeting k,t h e ni
will su
 er anonymity loss related to re-routing. Here Lik measures two kinds of
anonymity loss: one is the information leak because of this another forwarding
path, the other one is that due to the failed target node cannot response to i,t h e
probability of choosing malicious users as forwarders on the path increases.
We deﬁne i’s payo
  matrix as follows:
Ui(t
  1)
  [uqp]2
￿2
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ui(t) Ui(t)
￿ Lik
Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
￿ Li Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where [upq]2
￿2 denotes the player’s payo
  when she chooses strategy p and the other
player chooses strategy q.H e r eu11 represents the payo
  if the players follow the strat-
egy pair (S 1
￿S
￿
1), which is when the attacker chooses to target k and the user chooses
to remove the same user k. Thus, for i, the utility is her original utility value of Ui(t).
The term u21 represents the payo
  corresponding to the strategy pair (S 1
￿S
￿
2), which is
when the attacker targets a new node k
￿,b u ti still removes k. In this case we subtract
from the original utility the loss due to the attack to k
￿, as well as the loss of removing
the honest node k.T h et e r mu12 represents the payo
  of strategy pair (S 2
￿S
￿
1), that is
the attacker still targets k and i chooses to keep k, respectively. The term u22 represents
the payo
  of strategy tuple (S 2
￿S
￿
2), which is when the attacker targets k
￿ other than k
Table 1. Variables used in the modeling
Ui(t): user i’s payo
  at time t
UA( ): the DoS attacker’s payo
  at time t
Li: i’s anonymity loss following the removal of an honest user from router list
Lik: i’s anonymity loss because of DoS target k
n: the number of users in the system
c: the number of malicious users in the system
￿: the percentage of target nodes among honest users
pf: the forwarding policy of the system
Ck: the cost of targeting node k for the DoS attackers
Bk: the beneﬁt of de-anonymization for the DoS attackers because of successfully targeting k
B
￿: the beneﬁt of de-anonymizing for the DoS attackers when one honest user is removed from router list by i
P(oj
￿ai)t: the anonymity level measuring of user i at time tMinimising Anonymity Loss in Anonymity Networks under DoS Attacks 421
and i keeps k. In this case we subtract from the original utility the loss of the attack for
successfully targeting k
￿.
We deﬁne the attacker’s payo
  matrix as follows:
UA( )
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿Ck Bk
￿Ck
Bk
￿
￿Ck
￿
  B
￿ Bk
￿
￿Ck
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Here for Bk, since user i’s anonymity loss measured by Lik and Lik
￿ are actually the
attacker’s aim, the beneﬁt Bk, Bk
￿ are equal to Lik and Lik
￿, respectively. Similarly to Bk
above, the beneﬁt B
￿ is equal to Li. Thus, we have,
UA( )
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿Ck Lik
￿Ck
Lik
￿
  Li
￿Ck
￿ Lik
￿
￿Ck
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Note that when the costCk of targetingnode k is the same asCk
￿, the game is a zero-sum
game, that is, the total payo
  of these two players’ at each strategy pair is always
Ui(t
  1)
  UA( )
  Ui(t)
￿Ck
￿
User i’s loss is exactly balanced by the gains of the DoS attacker.
In order to ﬁnd an equilibrium of our model, we turn our attention to Nash’s theo-
rem [12], which proved that such games always have at least one equilibrium in mixed
strategies, we have:
Proposition 1.
X
 
￿
(Lik
￿ Lik
￿)
￿ (Ck
￿Ck
￿)
Li
  Lik
￿ (Li
  Lik
￿)
  (Ck
￿Ck
￿)
Li
  Lik
￿
￿ Y
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Li
Li
  Lik
Lik
Li
  Lik
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Proof. Typically, in a given game represented by a payo
  matrix Ap
￿q, vectors xj and
yj below form a pair of mixed strategies if
￿xj
￿
￿p
￿ xj
￿ 0
￿
￿p
j
￿1 xj
  1
￿,a n d
￿yj
￿
￿q
￿yj
￿ 0
￿
￿q
j
￿1 yj
  1
￿ hold. For our game, let us suppose that user i can play:
X
 
￿
x1 x2
￿
where x1
  x2
  1. An attacker can also play:
Y
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
y1
y2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
wherey1
 y2
  1.Then,accordingto[12],thebest-responsecorrespondencefunctionis
given by: P(x
￿y)
 
￿p
i
￿1
￿q
j
￿1 Aijxiyj
￿ Thus, replacing A with respectively Ui(t
 1) and
UA( ), we obtain the correspondencefunctions for user i and the attacker, respectively.
Pi(x
￿y)
  Ui(t)x1y1
 
￿
Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
x2y1
 
￿
Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
￿ Li
￿
x1y2
 
￿
Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
￿
x2y2
PA(x
￿y)
 
￿Ckx1y1
 
￿
Lik
￿Ck
￿
x2y1
 
￿
Lik
￿
  Li
￿Ck
￿
￿
x1y2
 
￿
Lik
￿
￿Ck
￿
￿
x2y2
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By solvingthe payo
 smatrix above,we get the Nash Equilibriumof the game in mixed
strategies.
￿
￿
The intuition behind the above equilibrium is that X is of the form [
￿
￿1
￿
￿], that is in
orderto gainmaximumpayo
 ,useri shouldremovek with probability
￿ (or at
￿ times).
If the anonymity system is symmetric (i.e., the users have the same equilibrium point)
or each user updates the router list from the blender of the system, instead of managing
it herself, then the two players of our game become: the DoS attackers and the group of
all the users. In this case if
￿ nodes are reported failed to the blender, then the optimal
strategy for the blender in our equilibriumanalysis is to remove
￿
￿
￿ nodesfrom router
list.
The game can reach a pure Nash equilibrium when some conditions are satisﬁed.
Corollary 1. Strategy ‘Keeping k’ is the best strategy, that is X
  [0
￿1] if the following
holds.
1. Lik
  Lik
￿;
2. Ck
  Ck
￿.
Observe that in C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocol, users are typically indistinguishable from each other
from the attacker’s point of view. The formulae of Corollary 1 are therefore often sat-
isﬁed in C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿-based systems. It follows from the above proposition that in those
systems the best response strategy for user i is to keep k.
3.3 Evaluating the Anonymity Loss of the Strategies
We now focus on the impact of the choice of a strategy on the anonymity of i.L e ti’s
utilities at t
 1w h e ni chooses strategy S be noted as Ui(t
 1)S, and the mixed strategy
respectively at Ui(t
  1)Mixed.
If user i always chooses to strategy S 1(, that is removing node k), the attacker will
always answer by choosing the strategy to target a di
 erent node k
￿, and the utility at
time t
  1 is evaluated as
Ui(t
  1)S 1
  Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿
￿ Li
￿
Similarly, the utilities of user i if she keeps k(, that is strategy S 2), or selects the mixed
Nash equilibrium strategy can be computed respectively as follows.
Ui(t
  1)S 2
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ui(t)
￿ Lik
￿ Lik
￿
￿ Lik
Ui(t)
￿ Lik Lik
￿
￿ Lik
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
  Ui(t)
￿
Lik
￿
  Li
Lik
  Li
Lik
All these three utilities decrease as time increases. We are of course interested in mini-
mizing the anonymity loss.
Proposition 2.
Ui(t
  1)S 1
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
￿ Ui(t
  1)S 2
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
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Proof. Because Ui(t
  1)S 1
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
 
￿
Lik
￿
￿L2
i
Lik
￿Li
￿ 0 holds, thus we obtain Ui(t
 
1)S 1
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed .I fLik
￿ Lik
￿,t h e nUi(t
  1)S 2
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
  Lik
Lik
￿
￿Lik
Li
￿Lik
￿ 0;
If Lik
￿ Lik
￿,t h e nUi(t
  1)S 2
￿ Ui(t
  1)Mixed
  Lik
Lik
￿Lik
￿
Li
￿Lik
￿ 0
￿ Thus, Ui(t
  1)S 2
￿
Ui(t
  1)Mixed
￿
￿
￿
The proposition shows that by selecting the equilibrium strategy, user i will gain the
maximum utility Ui(t
  1)Mixed. And as time increases, the distance between the mixed
strategy and other two will increase. Our simulations were written in Java, executed on
Sun’sJVM and based on C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ protocolwith indistinguishableusers. The parameters
are: c
  4, pf
  0
￿8; the DoS attackers always target two honest users at one time; we
vary the number n of users and increase time t until T. Because the users are indistin-
guishable, the mixed strategy is actually the pure strategy –keeping node k– according
to Corollary 1.
Figure 3(a) shows that by adopting the mixed strategy (keeping k), user i will gain
betterutilityas timeincreases.Figure3(b)depictsthe utilitiesofuseri at timet
 1when
adoptingthe mixedstrategyversusremovingnodek, comparedwith Ui(t). The diagram
shows that although these two utilities are smaller than Ui(t), selecting the ‘keep k’
strategy will always minimise i’s anonymity loss. As the number of users increases
(that is, the ratio of malicious users among the users decreases), the utilities increase
and the mixed strategy has more strength on decreasing the anonymity loss.
(a) i’s utilities decrease as time t increases.
n
  20
￿c
  4
￿ pf
  0
￿8.
(b) i’s utilities at time (t
  1) increase when
the number n of users increases, compared
with Ui(t). c
  4
￿ pf
  0
￿8.
Fig.3. i’s utilities
4 Reﬁned Protection Model
We have worked so far under the assumption that users know that the failed node k is
the DoS target. Now we proceedto relax such an assumption and generalise our results,
by taking the view that users cannot be sure about the type of k. Arguably, this is a
rather realistic hypothesisin openand dynamicsystems, where honestusers can also be
unavailable just because they su
 er power cuts or network downtime or congestion and
overloading. Another possibility is that the failed nodes are malicious users which are424 M. Yang and V. Sassone
carrying out attacks, such as reporting their predecessors as the most likely initiators,
which will slow them down. Because of that, their predecessors may also classify them
as unavailable
 unresponsivenodes. In this section we therefore assume that k may be a
normalhonestuser or a malicioususer, and repeatour analysis of DoS attack protection
model under such an assumption.
This new scenario di
 ers from those we considered so far in the paper in that when
a node k is detected as a failed node, rather than just considering it as a DoS target,
user i has to decide whether it is a malicious user or simply a normal honest user who
is just temporarily slowed down by e.g. network congestion. We deﬁne the uncertainty
about the type of a failed node as Pik(
￿
￿F), where
￿ is the type to which the failed
node belongs. More speciﬁcally, the term Pik(t
￿F) represents the probability that k en-
countered by user i is one DoS target and Pik(m
￿F), Pik(h
￿F) are the probabilities of k
being respectively a malicious user and normal user type. For these three probabilities,
we obviously have Pik(t
￿F)
  Pik(h
￿F)
  Pik(m
￿F)
  1.
In the rest of this section we work out again the best response strategy for user i
and analyze the impact of the di
 erent strategies on i’s anonymity under this reﬁned
scenario.
4.1 Re-modeling and the New Equilibrium
Our technical development proceeds mutatis mutandis as in the previous section. In
particular,asbeforewe ﬁrst modelthe interactionsbetweenusersandattackersbuilding
on ourpreviousmodel,thenwe study the equilibriumfromwhich ﬁnd the best response
for the users, and ﬁnally, we analyze the results.
Now, let L
￿
i denote the anonymity loss which user i su
 ers if she is attacked by a
malicious user. When i encounters a failed node, she may think it as a malicious node
(user) and then remove it. Thus she su
 ers the anonymity loss if the node is actually
honest user. We use Li (which is described in our model design section) to denote this
anonymity loss incurred by i when she removes a normal honest user from router list.
Then the utility function of user i becomes as follows.
Proposition 3. The utilities of user i under di
￿erent strategy pairs are evaluated as
follows.
Ui(t
  1)
  Ui(t)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Pik(h
￿F)Li (S 1
￿S
￿
1)
￿
Pik(h
￿F)Li
  Pik(t
￿F)(Lik
￿
  Li)
￿
(S 1
￿S
￿
2)
￿
Pik(m
￿F)L
￿
i
  Pik(t
￿F)Lik
￿
(S 2
￿S
￿
1)
￿
Pik(m
￿F)L
￿
i
  Pik(t
￿F)Lik
￿
￿
(S 2
￿S
￿
2)
Proof. When strategy pair (S 1
￿S
￿
1) is adopted, that is user i chooses to remove k from
router list and the attacker still targets k, we subtract the anonymityloss of removingan
honest user with probability Pik(h
￿F). When i still chooses to remove k but the attacker
targets a di
 erent node k
￿, then we ﬁrst subtract the loss Li that k is a normal honestMinimising Anonymity Loss in Anonymity Networks under DoS Attacks 425
user with probability Pik(h
￿F) from the original utility Ui(t). Then, with probability
Pik(t
￿F) we subtract the loss exerted by a successfully DoS attack (Lik
￿) and that of
removing k (Li). Here we omit the proof of the utilities under the last two strategy pairs
because they are similar to the ﬁrst two.
￿
￿
We then start studying the equilibrium of the reﬁned game model.
Proposition 4. For the DoS attacker, if all the targets look alike, that is Lik
  Lik
￿ and
Ck
  Ck
￿, then the following two Pure Nash equilibriums hold.
(S 1
￿S
￿
2),i f P ik(m
￿F)
￿
Li
Li
  L
￿
i
;
(S 2
￿S
￿
2),i f P ik(m
￿F)
￿
Li
Li
  L
￿
i
￿
Proof. Since Lik
￿ Ck
  Lik
￿
￿ Ck
￿ and Lik
￿
  Li
￿ Ck
￿
￿ Ck, the attacker will always
choose strategy S
￿
2. Under this situation, user i will compare the two utilities of her two
strategies S 1
￿S 2, and choosethe one which bringsher greaterpayo
 .Thuswe havethat
if
Pik(m
￿F)L
￿
i
  Pik(t
￿F)Lik
￿
￿ Pik(h
￿F)Li
  Pik(t
￿F)(Lik
￿
  Li)
￿
then i should choose S 1, which consist of removing k from the router list. Other-
wise, strategy S 2 should be chosen. From the formulae above and because Pik(t
￿F)
 
Pik(m
￿F)
  Pik(h
￿F)
  1, we obtain
Pik(m
￿F)
￿
Li
Li
  L
￿
i
￿
￿
￿
The value
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i depends on the certain system. The greater the value of
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i , the better
the strategy S 2. Figure 4 shows that user i’s best response strategy is inﬂuenced by the
probability Pik(m
￿F)t h a tk is malicious. Note that the value of Pik(m
￿F) is in the range
Fig.4. Utilities Ui(t
  1) of user i choosing strategy S 1 and S 2 are inﬂuenced by the probability
Pik(m
￿F)t h a tk is a malicious user426 M. Yang and V. Sassone
[0
￿1]. The two utilities intersect at the point Pik(m
￿F)
 
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i , which brings i the same
utility whatever strategy she chooses. When Pik(m
￿F)
  0, i.e., failed node k cannot be
malicious but either is the DoS target or a normal honest user, i should keep k in that
Ui(t
 1)S 2 is greater thanUi(t
 1)S 1.H o w e v e r ,w h e nPik(m
￿F)increases to 1, the utility
of S 1 remains at Ui(t) as before, while the utility of S 1 becomes Ui(t)
￿ L
￿
i. Therefore,
user i should remove k when k is more likely to be a malicious user, more precisely in
the range [
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i
￿1].
4.2 Predictions of Pik(m
￿ F)
Ourmodelshowsthat Pik(m
￿F)is an importantparameterwhichdetermineswhat strat-
egy user i should choose. However,the exact value of Pik(m
￿F)i sd i
Æcult to determine
for i.U s e ri cannot tell what type the failed node she encountered belongs to. In this
section we thereforefocuson Pik(m
￿F)s oastogi v ei a way to approximateand predict
its value.
The probability Pik(m
￿F) is a conditional probability representing that given i en-
counters a failed node, say k,t h e nk is malicious. By Bayes Theorem, it can be com-
puted as follows
Pik(m
￿F)
 
Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
Pr[k
  m]
Pr
￿
F
￿ (3)
where Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
is the conditional probability of encountering a failed node given
the node is malicious, Pr[k
  m] is the probability that node k is a malicious user, and
Pr
￿
F
￿
is the probability of encountering a failed node.
We ﬁrst study the probability Pr
￿
F
￿
in Eq. 3 which can be evaluated by applying the
total probability theorem. There are three possibilities: the node is failed because (1)
he is a normal honest user but su
 ering accidents; (2) he is an attacker; and (3) he is
the DoS target. We indicate them by respectively h, m and t these possibilities. Thus we
have:
Pr
￿
F
￿
 
￿
￿
￿h
￿m
￿t
Pr
￿
F
￿k
 
￿
￿
Pr[k
 
￿]
￿ (4)
For evaluation, Pr[k
 
￿] is determined by the composition of di
 erent types of users
in the system. For instance, the probability that one node is malicious Pr[k
  m]i s
evaluated by the ratio of malicious users c among all the users n:
Pr[k
  m]
 
c
n
￿ (5)
For other two types, by introducing
￿–the percentage of target nodes among honest
users–deﬁned in Table 1, we have
Pr[k
  t]
 
n
￿ c
n
￿
￿
￿
Pr[k
  h]
 
n
￿ c
n
￿ (1
￿
￿)
￿ (6)
As for theprobabilitiesPr
￿
F
￿k
 
￿
￿
where
￿
  t
￿h
￿m,since the targetnodesare always
failed to other users, the equation Pr
￿
F
￿k
  t
￿
  1 always holds. Now from Eq. 3–6,
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Proposition 5.
Pik(m
￿F)
 
Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
￿ c
n
Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
￿ c
n
  1
￿ n
￿c
n
￿
￿
  Pr
￿
F
￿k
  h
￿
￿ n
￿c
n
￿ (1
￿
￿)
We then study the partial derivatives of Proposition 5 to get the relationships among
Pik(m
￿F) and its parameters.
Corollary 2. For user i, the following hold.
￿Pik(m
￿F)
￿Pr[k
  m]
￿ 0
￿
￿Pik(m
￿F)
￿Pr[k
  h]
￿ 0
￿
￿Pik(m
￿F)
￿Pr[F
￿k
  m]
￿ 0
￿ and
￿Pik(m
￿F)
￿Pr[k
  t]
￿ 0
￿
From the corollaryabove,one sees that if user i ﬁnds the system to consists of relatively
more malicious users, then Pik(m
￿F) is more likely in the range of [
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i
￿1], thus it is
better for her to remove failed nodes. When the probability Pr[k
  m] increases to one,
the probability Pik(m
￿F) increases to one as well.
Such a prediction of Pik(m
￿F) can be observed by evaluating the anonymity level
guaranteed by the system, in that the anonymity level P(oj
￿ai) reﬂects the portion (via
Pr[k
  m]) of malicious users among all nodes. Consider an example where 10% of
malicious users are found unavailable due to being busy at deanonymizingthe systems,
and 1% of normal honest users are observed as failed nodes because of overloading or
other accidental reasons, then we have Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
  0
￿1a n dP r
￿
F
￿k
  h
￿
  0
￿01. We
get Figure 5(a), 5(b) depicting the changes of Pik(m
￿F) by varying Pr[k
  m] from 5%
to 100%, increasing the percentage
￿ of targeted users among honest users respectively.
These results are proved in Corollary 2 as well.
The probabilities Pr
￿
F
￿k
 
￿
￿
where
￿
  h
￿m
￿t depend on the attacks and the ob-
servations of the system. Since the nodes targeted by DoS attackers always appear as
failed nodes, the equation Pr
￿
F
￿k
  t
￿
  1 always holds. The value of Pr
￿
F
￿k
  h
￿
can be learned by observing how often normal honest users appear to have ‘failed’; this
should normally be relative small because not many normal users will su
 er overload-
ing, or other network accidents. As for Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
, it is usually small due to that the
(a) The probability Pik(m
￿ F)
increases when the percentage
of malicious users increases.
(b) The probability Pik(m
￿F)
decreases when
￿ increases.
(c) The probability Pik(m
￿ F)
decreases when Pr[F
￿k
  m]
increases.
Fig.5. The value of Pik(m
￿F)428 M. Yang and V. Sassone
malicious users do not want to be noticed or detected of doing de-anonymizing things.
In Figure 5(c), we have Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
vary from 1% to 37%, c
￿n
  10% and
￿
  5%.
When Pr
￿
F
￿k
  m
￿
is quite small, Pik(m
￿F) is very small and thus under this case,
Pik(m
￿F) is more likely in the range of [0
￿
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i ]. Therefore, keeping k in the router list
is the best strategy for i.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have investigated the best response for users to minimise their
anonymity loss when they come across ‘failed’ nodes under DoS attacks. We used a
game-theoretic approach for our analysis.
We modelled the problem and formalised the payo
 s of users and attackers accord-
ing to the strategies they choose. By Nash Equilibria, we showed that in a symmetric
protocol like C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, keeping failed node is the strategy users should choose. We then
re-modelled the problem by taking into account that the user’s uncertainty about the
typology of failed nodes they encounter. Our results showed that when the important
parameter Pik(m
￿F) is in the range of [
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i
￿1], users should remove the failed nodes
andwheni ti ss mal l ert han
Li
Li
￿L
￿
i ,the beststrategyis insteadto retainthem.We proposed
a way to predict the value of Pik(m
￿F) and showed its changes when the parameters
vary.
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